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MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONs--REGULATION oF HousE TRAILERS UNDER
BUILDING CoDE AS PERMANENT DwELLINGs--An ordinance of the township
in which defendant maintained a trailer camp defined a house trailer as any
vehicle used for living or sleeping purposes, and provided that any house trailer
so used within the township for an aggregate of more than thirty days in a
period of one year should be considered a single family dwelling for all purposes
of the building code. Many trailers in defendant's camp rested on boxes or
jacks, and they had been used as dwellings for several years. While all trailers
were connected with water and electric lines and provided with communal
lavatory and laundry facilities, they clearly did not comply with the requirements of the building code. Defendant contended that a trailer camp could be
prohibited or regulated only by a zoning ordinance, and that the current house
shortage ought to make this restriction void. H eU, the ordinance was not an
attempt to regulate trailer camps, but dwellings under the building code.1 Thirty
days was a fair standard to determine whether the use was temporary or permanent and as such subject to the code. As the court was not concerned with the

1 A trailer "is: a mobile home, principlll case at 57 5; ''little houses on wheels,»
Foos v. Engle, 295 Ky. 114 at 122, 174 S.W. (2d) 5 (1943).
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wisdom of the ordinance, the house shortage could not be considered as a reason
for invalidating the ordinance. Lower Merion Township v. Gallup, 158 Pa.
Super. 572, 46 A. (2d) 35 (1946).
The growth of trailer camps and the increased use of trailers as permanent
dwellings make the consideration of municipal regulations pertinent. The problem is of recent concern,2 and case law, is limited. Some states have occupied
the field 8 and so have restricted .municipalities to supplemental regulations.4
While trailer camps are not nuisances per se,5 they are subject to control under
the police power by means of zoning 6 or by health and sa(ety regulations. 7 The
use of trailers has -been restricted to trailer camps 8 and the length of occupancy
of the site limited.9 Security of home life, preservation of a favorable environment in which to rear children, protection of morals and health, stabilization
of the use and value of property, and the attracting of a desirable citizenry are
reasons cited to uphold the regulations.10 However, an absolute prohibition on,
the use of trailers has been held to be arbitrary and unreasonable,11 and zoning
regulations solely to prevent particular trailer camps have been struck down by
the courts.12 In the principal case, 'the housing shortage could have been considered as a factor in determining the reasonableness of the township's exercise
of its police power. This is the only case in which trailers were deemed perma2
Richards v. City of Pontiac, 305 Mich. 666, 9 N.W. (2d) 885 (1943); Right
of city to establish tourist camp see II5 A.L.R. 1398 (1938).
8
'
Cal.-, Gen. Laws (Deering, 1939) §18600, as amended, Cal. Laws (1945)
§18600.5; Fla. Stat. Ann. (1943) c. 513; Ore. Comp.1 Laws Ann. (1940) §99-1501;
Mich. Stat. Ann. (1945) §5. 278.
4
Egan v. City of Miami, 130 Fla. 465, 178 S. 132 (1938); Loose v. City of
Battle Creek, 309 Mich. 1, 14 N.W. (2d) 554 (1944); Richards v. City of Pontiac,
305 Mich. 666, 9 N.W. (2d) 885 (1943) (ordinance in conflict with state law held
void).
11
State v. Hayes Inv. Corp., 13 Wash. (2d) 306, 125 P. (2d) 262 (1942);
Richards v. City of Pontiac, 305 Mich. 666, 9 N.W. (2d) 885 (1943); Pringle
(and City of Port Huron Intervenor) v. Shevnock, 309 Mich. 179, 14 N.W. (2d)
827 (1944).
- 6
Egan v. City of Miami, 130 Fla. 465, 178 S. 132 (1938); Davis v. City of
Mobile, 245 Ala So, 16 S. (2d) 1 (1943).
1
Miller v. Quigg, 87 Fla. 462, 100 S. 270 (1924) Tent City; Loose v. City of
Battle Creek, 309 Mich. 1, 14 N.W. (2d) 554 (1944).
8
Davis v. City of Mobile, -245 Ala. So, 16 S. (2d) 1 (1943); Not more than one
trailer on private premise, Loose v. Cit}; of Battle Creek, 309 Mich. 1, 14 N.W. (2d)
554 (1944).
9
Loose v. City of Battle Creek, 309 Mich. 1, 14 N.W. (2d) 554 (1944) (six
weeks); Cady v. City of Detroit, 289 Mich. 499, 286 N. W. 805 (1939) (ninety
days), noted in 38 M1cH .. L. REv. 400 (1940); Renker v. Village of Brooklyn, 139
Ohio St. 484, 40 N.E. (2d) 925 (1942) (sixty days), noted 5 UNiv. DET. L. J. 200
(1942).
1
°Cady v. City of Detroit, 289 Mich. 499, 286 N.W. 805 (1939).
11
Commonwe~th v. Amos, 30 Del. Co. (Pa.) 552 (1941).
12
State v. Hayes Inv. Corp., 13 Wash. (2d) 306, 125 P, (2d) 262 (1942);
Pringle (and City of Port Huron Intervenor) v. Shevnock, 309 Mich. 179, 14 N.W.
(2d) 827 (1944).
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nent dwellings 18 and subject to the requirements of the building code. The
court might have looked through the subterfuge, for in effect the regulation
amounts to prohibition.

John W. Potter, S.Ed.

18 See Foos v. Engle, 295 Ky. II4, 174 S.W. (2d) 5 (1943), where trailers were
not held to be dwellings under restrictive covenants.

